COPYCAT COMPLIANCE AND THE IRONIES OF
“BEST PRACTICE”
William R. Heaston
ABSTRACT
For too long, corporate compliance “best practices” have been hiding
in plain sight. While they are readily invoked, compliance scholars have yet
to examine them in any depth. This Comment provides a corrective, arguing
that a confluence of inter- and extra-organizational forces has driven many
firms to engage in copycat compliance, whereby they mimic other firms’
“best practice” compliance structures. This tendency reveals two
potentially problematic ironies about so-called “best practices” in the
corporate compliance domain. First, they tend to reflect common practices
rather than practices that are, in fact, “best.” Second, a formalistic focus
on copying common practices may well undercut some of the most important
or “best of the best” practices in compliance management—the promotion
of ethical behavior within corporations and the customization of compliance
structures so that they mesh with prevailing organizational cultures. In light
of these ironies, this Comment proposes a conceptual framework that may
provide a basis for identifying more fruitful types of convergence on common
compliance best practices. Such best practices would trade rote mimicry for
a more functional approach that permits greater variation in compliance
structures and processes to suit the particular operational, cultural, and
ethical needs of implementing firms.
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INTRODUCTION
It is our hope that our compliance examinations will encourage your
firms to assess their compliance programs and to adopt best practices in
fulfilling their compliance responsibilities.1
Complying with laws and regulations while simultaneously assuring the
highest ethical conduct largely is dependent on a board’s commitment to
compliance best practices.2
Corporate compliance has come of age as a field of legal practice and
as an area of academic inquiry.3 Its salience has never been as pronounced
1. Mary Ann Gadziala, Assoc. Dir., Off. of Compliance Inspections & Examinations,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Bond Market Association’s Ninth Annual
Legal and Compliance Conference: The Vital Role of Effective Comprehensive Compliance
Controls at Broker-Dealers (Feb. 4, 2004).
2. Bill Ide, Moving Beyond Quality, TRUSTEE, June 2011, at 29, 29.
3. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2077 (2016) (asserting that “American corporate governance has
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as it is today—compliance program expenditures have reached
unprecedented levels;4 recent compliance failures have generated record
penalties;5 a burgeoning “cottage industry” of compliance consultants has
emerged and never been more lucrative;6 and compliance-related scholarship
has grown in prominence and sophistication.7
Alongside these
developments, legal authorities in the United States have recently published
new compliance guidelines. In May 2021, the American Law Institute,
renowned for its various Restatements of the Law, approved a draft of its
first-ever compilation of corporate compliance principles.8 And in April
undergone a quiet revolution” driven by the ascendancy of corporate compliance); Geoffrey
Parsons Miller, Compliance: Past, Present and Future, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 437 (2017)
(“Compliance . . . is coming of age as a field of legal practice, as a subject taught in law
schools, and as a field of research and analysis by academics and thoughtful practitioners.”);
Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1004
(2017) (“Compliance is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations,
and academics—are quick to tout its power and potential for good.”).
4. Enterprise Governance, Risk & Compliance Market Worth $97.3 Billion by 2028,
GRAND VIEW RSCH. (Apr. 2021), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-e
nterprise-governance-risk-compliance-egrc-market [https://perma.cc/T6RD-E23A]; see also
William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 392, 392–94
(2018) (noting the remarkable level of corporate compliance expenditures today and
predicting that the number of compliance officers within corporations will soon surpass the
number of police officers on the streets).
5. E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Goldman Sachs Resolves Foreign Bribery Case
and Agrees to Pay Over $2.9 Billion (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/
goldman-sachs-resolves-foreign-bribery-case-and-agrees-pay-over-29-billion [https://perma.
cc/VPX7-EX56]; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and
Agree to Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery
Case in History (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskemplead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve
[https://perma.cc/VPX7-EX56].
6. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1999). See generally Tanina Rostain, The
Emergence of ‘Law Consultants’, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1404–07 (2006) (describing the
rise of the compliance consulting industry). Compliance is “one of the fastest growing areas
of legal practice” today. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character
Theory of Corporate Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 542 (2018); see also Jennifer M.
Pacella, The Regulation of Lawyers in Compliance, 95 WASH. L. REV. 947, 953–58 (2020)
(discussing the recent influx of lawyers within the compliance profession).
7. See generally GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE (1st ed. 2014) (comprising the first casebook dedicated specifically to the
study of corporate compliance); THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (Benjamin van
Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2021) (compiling compliance scholarship from multiple
disciplinary perspectives).
8. Principles of the Law, Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations, THE AM. L.
INST., https://www.ali.org/publications/show/compliance-risk-management-and-enforcemen
t/ [https://perma.cc/57CN-N556] (last visited Feb. 27, 2022). See generally James A. Fanto,
The Governing Authority’s Responsibilities in Compliance and Risk Management, as Seen in
the American Law Institute’s Draft Principles of Compliance, Risk Management, and
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2019 and June 2020, the Department of Justice released updated guidance
regarding its evaluations of corporate compliance programs,9 notably
stressing the importance of data-driven approaches to risk mitigation.10
Increasingly, foreign jurisdictions are publishing their own compliance
program guidelines as well,11 and even international organizations with no
prior involvement in compliance have published international standards
purporting to codify generally accepted compliance principles.12
Collectively, these developments are indicative of a widespread trend in
which academics, compliance professionals, regulators, and corporate actors
are seeking to identify, develop, share, and implement so-called corporate
compliance “best practices.”
The proliferation of best practices is as readily apparent in the
compliance world as it is underexamined by compliance scholars. Indeed,
while talk of best practices is pervasive,13 in-depth examination is sorely
lacking. Many scholarly invocations of the phrase amount to little more than
Enforcement, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 699 (2018) (describing this project).
9. Aisling O’Shea et al., DOJ Updates Guidance on the Evaluation of Corporate
Compliance Programs, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 20, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/20/doj-updates-guidance-on-the-evaluation-ofcorporate-compliance-programs/ [https://perma.cc/5SA2-DQ6F].
10. Todd Haugh, Leading a Healthier Company: Advancing a Public Health Model of
Ethics and Compliance, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 799, 818 (2021).
11. See, e.g., Nicolette Kost de Sèvres, The French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA) 2021
Guidelines Relating to the Sapin II Law: 5 Key Points, MAYER BROWN (Jan. 22, 2021), https
://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2021/01/the-french-anti-corru
ption-agency-afa-2021-guidelines-relating-to-the-sapin-ii-law-5-key-points [https://perma.cc
/9QYA-NT49] (discussing new anti-corruption guidelines published in France); Aziz
Rahman, SFO Publishes New ‘Internal’ Guidance for Evaluating Compliance Programs, THE
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 21, 2020), https://fcpablog.com/2020/01/21/sfo-publishes-new-internalguidance-for-evaluating-compliance-programs/ [https://perma.cc/WQG3-VPXX] (discussing
new compliance guidance published by the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom); see
also Andrew Spalding, Restoring Pre-Existing Compliance through the FCPA Pilot Program,
48 U. TOL. L. REV. 519, 535 (2017) (noting other international sources of corporate
compliance best practices, such as the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank).
12. See generally William R. Heaston, Clickbait Compliance and Transnational
Corruption, 48 U. DAYTON L. REV. (forthcoming 2022–23) (on file with author) (examining
this trend of international compliance standard-setting); ISO/TC 309: Governance of
Organizations – Projects, ISO, https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc309/home/projects.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/JP7C-6P96] (last visited Feb. 27, 2022) (listing an array of international
standard-setting projects spanning the areas of corporate compliance, corporate governance,
anti-bribery management systems, whistleblowing management systems, and corporate
internal investigations).
13. See Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 999 n.299
(2009) (“[T]he term ‘best practices’ surfaces throughout much of the compliance literature.”);
Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 71 BUS. LAW. 227, 245 (2015) (observing a
“growing body of writing on best practices in corporate compliance”).
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throwaway usage, citing “best practices” as if their meaning and desirability
were self-evident.14 Such treatments are somewhat understandable given
that those who actually flesh out the term tend to cite techniques that “are
mostly commonsense: [the] ‘promulgation of codes of behavior, the
institution of training programs, the identification of internal compliance
personnel and the creation of procedures and controls[.]’”15 These
conventional approaches, however, leave much to be desired. By failing to
scrutinize best practices altogether or by compiling detailed lists of particular
(and often commonsensical) practices, compliance scholars have overlooked
the emergence of best practices as a distinct phenomenon and theoretical
concept, one that universally drives compliance practice and provides a core
logic underpinning much of contemporary compliance theory.
This Comment provides a corrective by proposing a spectrum of
compliance best practices. In so doing, it argues that a confluence of interand extra-organizational forces (from government, industry, and the
compliance profession) often drives firms to engage in a superficial and
formalistic practice of “copycat compliance”16 in which they mimic each
14. Indeed, many treat the term as if it were self-defining. See, e.g., John Armour et al.,
Board Compliance, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1262 (2020) (“A further measure would be for
a regulator not only to require a CC [compliance committee] but also [to] establish standards
of CC ‘best practice.’”); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Compliance into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 322–23 (2017) (“[R]egulation becomes a
means for regulators to encourage firms to implement and sustain best practices for their
internal compliance controls.”); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of
Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 248 (2016) [hereinafter
Bird & Park, Domains of Corporate Counsel] (arguing that ceding authority on compliance
matters to a designated Chief Compliance Officer may provide “evidence of the adoption of
best practices”); Nathaniel Grow & Todd Haugh, Assessing the NCAA as a Compliance
Organization, 2021 WIS. L. REV. 787, 849 (“[B]est practices from corporate compliance can
provide useful lessons.”); Todd Haugh, Caremark’s Behavioral Legacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV.
611, 642 (2018) (“These same behavioral concepts can be incorporated into the best practices
of the compliance program itself.”); Yelena Niazyan, Note, The Way We Do Things Around
Here: What Progressive Prosecutors can Learn from Corporate Compliance, 76 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 131, 202 (2020) (advocating for a “commitment to compliance best practices”);
Nicola Faith Sharpe, Prioritizing Process: Empowering the Corporate Ethics and Compliance
Function, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (“It is clear that an effective [compliance] program
incorporates FCPA best practices.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Teaching Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L.
REV. 399, 402 (2016) (“[M]uch like with various types of compliance, there are certain ‘best
practices’ to teaching compliance . . . .”); Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making
Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45
CONN. L. REV. 483, 519–20 (2012) (listing various “best practices” and arguing that the SEC’s
bounty program under the Dodd-Frank Act ignores them).
15. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 24 (2019)
(quoting Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings
and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466–67 (2008)).
16. This term was first used in the literature by Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective
Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 820–21 (2014) in the context of
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other’s compliance structures to minimize legal liability risks. This practice
reveals two ironies about “best practices” in the corporate compliance
domain. First, there is nothing inherently “best” about them; more often than
not, they reflect what is commonly done rather than what is most effective in
some empirically validated sense.17 Second, a formalistic focus on
implementing common compliance practices may ironically undercut what
are widely considered to be among the most important or “best of the best”
practices: the promotion of ethical behavior—not just legal risk mitigation
strategies—within corporations, and the tailoring of compliance structures to
context-specific organizational dynamics to facilitate a culture of
compliance.18
Together, these ironies illustrate some of the potential problems with
corporations converging on common compliance “best practices.”
Importantly, however, convergence and commonality need not always entail
copycat behavior. As this Comment asserts, there can be different degrees
of convergence and, by implication, different levels or conceptions of “best
practices”—from a shallow convergence on common, high-level principles;
to a more pragmatic, “functional” convergence on common outcome
variables that permits significant variation in the approaches corporations
take to achieve them; to a more rigid, formalistic convergence that tends to
promote copycat compliance. Much of contemporary compliance practice
trends toward the formal when it should be geared more toward the
functional. This Comment identifies reasons for this state of affairs as well
as ways in which it might be rectified, laying the groundwork for legal
scholars to devote more sustained and nuanced attention to the concept of
corporate compliance best practices going forward.
The remainder of the Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides an
overview of the corporate compliance field, defining its contours and
describing its maturation over the past three decades from a taken-forgranted issue to a high-priority concern for firms and regulators. Part II
examines the phenomenon of corporate compliance best practices. It
proposes a conceptual framework that outlines three possible degrees of
convergence on best practices: (1) an ideational convergence centered on
broad, high-level commitments; (2) a formal convergence that generally

compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For a non-academic source that uses the term, see
Michael Volkov, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Copycat Compliance, CORRUPTION, CRIME
& COMPLIANCE (Oct. 31, 2011), https://blog.volkovlaw.com/2011/10/the-emperor-has-no-cl
othes-copycat-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/DZV3-8HN9].
17. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 325–26 (2006).
18. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
933 (2017) (discussing the growing emphasis on ethical and cultural considerations in the
compliance field).
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promotes mimicry; and (3) an in-between level of functional convergence.19
This Part then employs insights from isomorphism, a socio-legal theory of
organizational homogeneity, to identify different drivers of convergence in
the corporate compliance sphere, an analysis which ultimately shows that
formal convergence best characterizes much of current compliance practice.
Some concerns about this kind of convergence are then raised. Finally, Part
III aims to provide additional clarity in two ways. First, it briefly examines
convergence and best practices within a specific topical area—anti-bribery
compliance—to make some of the Comment’s conceptual insights more
concrete. Second, it suggests some ways in which scholars might further
develop the study of compliance best practices, something that would benefit
both compliance theory and practice.
I. THE NATURE AND RISE OF COMPLIANCE
In one sense, corporate compliance might not seem like a novel concept.
For as long as corporations have existed, one of their chief concerns has been
complying with pertinent laws and regulations.20 Indeed, it is a time-honored
19. “Ideational convergence” is my own term. The distinction between “formal
convergence” and “functional convergence” has been adapted from the comparative corporate
governance literature. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance:
Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 329, 332, 336, 356 (2001)
(introducing and distinguishing these two types of convergence). The basic idea is that formal
convergence entails a push toward the homogenization of legal rules and structures, whereas
functional convergence preserves context-specific governance structures even as it entails a
convergence on the same substantively desirable outcomes. See id. at 337 (providing an
example of corporate governance systems that were widely divergent in a formal sense yet
enjoyed an important degree of functional convergence in the sense that they each possessed
successful systems for replacing poorly performing senior managers). Of course, as with any
dichotomy, distinctions are often more easily drawn in theory than in the real-world. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 682 n.148 (1999) (observing that
the line between “formal convergence” and “functional convergence” may at times be difficult
to draw in practice). As such, a more fruitful way of thinking about the two concepts is in
terms of a rough spectrum (i.e., leaning more/less toward formal convergence or more/less
toward functional convergence) rather than in terms of rigid dichotomies. See infra Part II.B
B. Three Levels of Convergence (employing this approach and sketching a continuum that
allows for different degrees of convergence among different corporations’ compliance
systems).
20. See James A. Burkhardt, The History of the Development of the Law of Corporations,
4 NOTRE DAME LAW. 221, 221–22 (1929) (discussing the development of corporations from
ancient times to the twentieth century and noting “how at every turn the law . . . has been
imposing restraints upon” them); Robert L. Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, 19
HARV. L. REV. 350, 350 (1906) (“Several persons associate themselves and comply with
certain forms prescribed by law, and the result is something having an identity and existence
entirely independent from these persons, and with rights, powers, and duties of its own.”); see
also Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility:
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principle of corporate law that corporations can only be chartered for lawful
purposes,21 and many “courts have broadly interpreted [this dictate] to
include the ongoing manner in which business is conducted.”22 Thus,
“[l]egal compliance is a first-order requirement” for corporations, one that
precedes their much-discussed profit-making function.23 As Leo E. Strine,
Jr., former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, and coauthors put
it: “American corporate law embeds law compliance within the very mission
of the corporation.”24
Notwithstanding its historical pedigree, corporate compliance today—
both as a profession and as a focus of regulatory scrutiny—is markedly
different from anything found in prior centuries or even recent decades.
Whereas compliance considerations were once implicitly and exclusively
subsumed within the work of corporate legal departments, present-day
compliance is a profession unto itself, with its own educational programs,
professional associations, consulting companies, and standalone corporate
departments.25 This profession, thanks in large part to the dizzying array of
laws passed in recent years to curb corporate misconduct,26 is a booming
one.27 As Sean Griffith colorfully asserted, “American corporations have
witnessed the dawn of a new era: the era of compliance.”28 This Part traces
the rise of this unprecedented era, beginning with an exposition of corporate
compliance—its general nature and conceptual contours—itself.
When it comes to charting the definitional parameters of compliance,
scholars have reached common ground on some issues and diverged on
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2012) (“Law, after all,
mandates . . . compliance with specified standards of behavior. Apart from a decision to
comply or disobey, there is no real exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law.”).
21. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(b) (2022).
22. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 721 (2019).
23. Id. at 722.
24. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 653 n.71 (2010).
25. James A. Fanto, The Professionalization of Compliance: Its Origins, Progress,
Impediments, and Outcomes, 35 NOTRE DAME J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 184–85 (2021); see
also Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May
Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 91 (2014) (characterizing compliance as a “new
profession”).
26. See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance Management Systems: Do They
Make a Difference?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 7, at 571,
575 (discussing numerous laws passed in the wake of corporate scandals that either mandate
or incentivize the adoption of compliance management systems); Ellen S. Podgor, A New
Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537,
1539 (2007) (“New legal developments make it increasingly difficult for corporations to
comply with the law.”).
27. See Pacella, supra note 6, at 953–63 (describing this “compliance boom”).
28. Griffith, supra note 3, at 2077.
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others. On the one hand, there is substantial agreement regarding the general
elements of compliance; on the other hand, there are notable differences in
the ways in which scholars construe its boundaries.29 In terms of
commonality, scholars agree that compliance is fundamentally about “the
interaction between rules and behavior.”30 Broadly conceived, corporate
compliance encompasses the processes by which corporate actors seek to
align corporate behavior with the requirements of external and internal
rules.31 Scholars also generally agree that compliance is a pluralistic field,
meaning that it consists of a breathtaking variety of rules—from formal laws
and company policies to less formal private standards and voluntary codes
to informal social norms and ethical values—all of which exert pressure on
corporate actors to comply with varying requirements.32
Beyond these areas of overarching agreement, however, there are some
important differences. First, compliance scholars differ in how they
conceptualize the relationship between rules and corporate behavior. Some
view the relationship in a top-down fashion, focusing on how organizations
react to legal rules and how these rules can be modified to induce greater
corporate compliance.33 Others view the relationship in more bottom-up or
29. Veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance Investigations, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 264 (2020). These differences are likely attributable to the interdisciplinary nature of
compliance scholarship, with scholars conceptualizing compliance in different ways
depending on their particular disciplinary backgrounds. See Fanto, supra note 25, at 223–24
(discussing different conceptions of compliance informed by different disciplines such as law,
business ethics, organizational studies, management, and social psychology).
30. Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol, Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction
between Rules and Behavior, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 7,
at 1, 3.
31. See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 205 (2019)
(defining compliance as “a firm’s effort to ensure that it and its agents adhere to legal and
regulatory requirements, industry practice, and the firm’s own internal policies and norms”).
32. See van Rooij & Sokol, supra note 30, at 6 (“[T]he reality of compliance is that
individuals and especially organizations face a multitude of rules and do so often on a
continual basis.”); Root, supra note 31, at 209 (remarking on “the sheer breadth and diversity
of issues compliance programs must confront”). On the pluralist nature of legal and normative
orders more generally, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155 (2007).
33. See van Rooij & Sokol, supra note 30, at 3 (stating that compliance has traditionally
been concerned with the question of “how people respond to rules and come to adapt their
behavior to the rules”). Proponents of optimal deterrence theory and Law and Economics
approaches to compliance tend to fall into this camp. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Marcel
Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323,
344–53 (2017) (examining different possibilities for incentivizing optimal corporate
policing); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 687–95 (1997) (proposing
a modified corporate criminal liability regime that aims to induce optimal corporate selfpolicing); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 789–90 (2013)
(proposing a carrots-and-sticks approach designed to optimize corporate antitrust
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dynamic terms, arguing that rules and behaviors are mutually constitutive
and, as such, require a conception of compliance that takes into account how
corporate actors proactively shape the meaning of the rules with which they
comply.34 Accounts that take both approaches into account are growing in
the corporate compliance literature, a development which has led to
increasingly more holistic and sophisticated conceptions of compliance
theory.35
Second, although compliance scholars universally acknowledge the
pluralistic regulatory environment in which corporations operate, some tend
to focus more on compliance with certain types of rules over others. For
instance, Miriam Baer stresses adherence to formal legal rules, defining
compliance as “a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to
deter violations of law and to assure external authorities that they are taking
steps to deter violations of law.”36 By contrast, Todd Haugh defines
compliance more in terms of informal normative pressure, describing it as
an “attempt to deter corporate wrongdoing by generating social norms that
champion law-abiding behavior.”37 Similarly, Veronica Root Martinez
views compliance in broad terms as “a firm’s effort to ensure that it and its
agents adhere to legal and regulatory requirements, industry practice, and the
firm’s own internal policies and norms.”38 Others focus even more broadly
compliance).
34. See van Rooij & Sokol, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that “a growing body of research
in sociology and anthropology” focuses on “how people’s responses to rules shape the
meaning and functioning of such rules”). Socio-legal scholars and organizational theorists
tend to fall into this camp. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or
Not to Comply – That isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of
Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103, 103–04
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2012) (describing a process of legal
endogeneity through which organizations shape the meaning of legal compliance); Fiona
Haines, Compliance and Contestation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE, supra
note 7, at 93, 93 (stressing that the meaning of compliance is determined within “a contested
landscape”); Shauhin Talesh, A New Institutional Theory of Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
617, 625–48 (2015) (examining how insurance companies actively shape the meaning of legal
compliance); see also David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate
Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 359–64 (2016) (reviewing relevant research in this vein).
35. See generally THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 7 (collecting
recent compliance scholarship).
36. Baer, supra note 13, at 958.
37. Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215,
1221 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Root, supra note 31, at 205. It has become a cliché in the literature to speak of going
“beyond (mere legal) compliance.” See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy
Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 339 (2004) (identifying economic, reputational,
and prosocial reasons for “beyond compliance” behavior); Radu Mares, Global Corporate
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on the need for compliance to incorporate ethical precepts and values.39 The
point here is not to establish which one of these lenses is more compelling.40
Rather, the point is to highlight how scholars have increasingly interpreted
the scope of compliance in ever more expansive terms, broadening their
understanding of it so that compliance involves more than just abiding by the
letter of particular legal rules. This trend is emblematic of corporate
compliance’s evolution and rise to prominence more generally.
While a comprehensive treatment of the evolution of compliance
practice—and the emergence of today’s “era of compliance”41—cannot be
provided here,42 highlighting a few developments from the late twentieth
century to the present should be more than sufficient to explain how
compliance rose to the level of importance that it currently enjoys.43 Prior to
the 1970s, “responsibility for policing the behavior of corporations and other
business entities was perceived as resting on the shoulders of public officials,

Social Responsibility, Human Rights and Law: An Interactive Regulatory Perspective on the
Voluntary-Mandatory Dichotomy, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 221, 221 (2010) (critiquing
the notion of “beyond compliance”).
39. See, e.g., Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of Compliance into
Ethics, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 453, 454 (2009) (arguing that a focus on “letter-of-the-law”
compliance shortchanges “spirit-of-the-law” ethics); Christopher Michaelson, Compliance
and the Illusion of Ethical Progress, 66 J. BUS. ETHICS 241 passim (2006) (examining the
tensions between ethical considerations and legal compliance); Lynn S. Paine, Managing for
Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 106, 111 (promoting an
integrity-based approach to ethics management that “is broader, deeper, and more demanding
than . . . legal compliance”); Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of
Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 267, 274 (2014) (“We want [corporate actors] not just to comply
with the law, but to be motivated by internal [ethical] values to willingly obey the law.”);
Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging Ethics in Organizations: A Review of Some Key Research
Findings, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 302 (2014) (“[I]t is essential to look beyond formal . . .
compliance initiatives to a company’s overall ethical condition.”).
40. That said, I do think that a broader conceptual framing of compliance is more accurate
as a descriptive matter and more desirable as a prescriptive matter than a narrow, law-centric
conception of compliance.
41. Griffith, supra note 3, at 2077.
42. For two excellent comprehensive treatments of this subject, see Rebecca Walker,
N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate Compliance in the United States:
A Brief Overview, 2012 WL 3887138 (Feb. 28, 2012), and John H. Walsh, A History of
Compliance, in 1 MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5
(David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015).
43. Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring a Maturing Industry, 48 U. TOL.
L. REV. 429 (2017) also provides a succinct list of reasons for compliance’s evolution,
although his discussion stretches back into the nineteenth century. These reasons include the
passage of general incorporation statutes during the early 1800s, the concentration of wealth
and power in certain industries in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the rise of the administrative
state (and marked increases in business regulation as a result), and the articulation of state
corporate law-based compliance obligations (e.g., Caremark duties). Id. at 429–31.
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including regulators and prosecutors.”44 Beginning in the 1970s, however,
government enforcement authorities began to rely more on corporations to
engage in their own self-policing efforts, passing a variety of statutes (e.g.,
the Bank Secrecy Act of 197045 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
197746) that pressured corporations to implement internal compliance
measures.47 For roughly the next two decades, scholars and practitioners
conceptualized compliance in fairly narrow terms—compliance was mainly
a concern for highly regulated industries, and within these industries
companies crafted targeted compliance programs to meet the requirements
of particular laws.48 “Thus, in their earliest iterations, most compliance
programs focused on specific risk areas” such as antitrust, environmental
law, anti-money laundering, and anti-bribery.49 While these developments
put corporate compliance more explicitly on the map, they did so in a manner
that advanced a narrow, statute-specific view of compliance.
This compartmental approach to compliance began to change in the
early 1990s. In 1991, the United States Federal Sentencing Commission
published a new chapter in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines dedicated
specifically to organizational offenders.50 More than anything else, this new
chapter—the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines—played a pivotal role
in the development of compliance into a distinct discipline and high priority
for firms and regulators.51 The Organizational Guidelines introduced a
generally applicable, carrots-and-sticks approach to incentivizing
compliance; the carrot was the promise of mitigated penalties for companies
that implemented an “effective” compliance program, and the stick was a
steep increase in criminal penalties for the commission of misconduct.52
44. Steven A. Lauer & Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance and Ethics Programs: What
Lawyers Need to Know to Understand the Development of this Field, 75 BUS. LAW. 2541,
2543 (2020).
45. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-4 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 18, and 31 U.S.C.).
46. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd).
47. Lauer & Murphy, supra note 44, at 2543–44; see also Arlen & Kraakman, supra note
33, at 695–718 (discussing compliance incentives and the pivotal role they play within the
United States’ respondeat superior system of corporate criminal and civil liability).
48. Lauer & Murphy, supra note 44, at 2545–48.
49. Id. at 2545.
50. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade
of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 701–02 (2002).
51. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 2084 (arguing that “the present era of compliance began
in 1991 with the adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations”); Haugh, supra note 10, at 808 (describing the passage of the Organizational
Guidelines as “a watershed moment” in compliance history); Lauer & Murphy, supra note
44, at 2549 (“The Organizational Guidelines had a dramatic impact on the field [of
compliance].”).
52. Griffith, supra note 3, at 2084–85; see also Ketanji Brown Jackson & Kathleen
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Importantly, the Organizational Guidelines incentivized all organizations
(not just corporations in heavily regulated industries) to take compliance
seriously and implement their own comprehensive compliance programs.53
As such, the Organizational Guidelines broadened the concept of compliance
in a fundamental and lasting way, making it clear that “compliance programs
should encompass more than discrete subject areas” and requirements
covered by specific statutes.54 This broadening is perhaps best evidenced by
the language of the guidelines themselves, which stress the importance of
organizational culture and ethics in addition to legal compliance.55
Since the publication of the Organizational Guidelines, compliance has
exploded in popularity due to the ways in which courts, prosecutors, and
regulators have applied them. In the seminal corporate law case of In re
Caremark, Chancellor William Allen suggested in dicta that a board’s failure
to develop an effective compliance program might amount to a dereliction
of monitoring and oversight duties triggering director liability.56 In making
this suggestion, he gave special attention to the importance of the
Organizational Guidelines, remarking that “[a]ny rational person attempting
in good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be
bound to take into account [the Organizational Guidelines] and the enhanced
penalties and opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers.”57 While the

Cooper Grilli, “Carrot and Stick” Philosophy: The History of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines and the Emergence of Effective Compliance and Ethics Programs, in THE
COMPLETE COMPLIANCE & ETHICS MANUAL 1.25, 1.25 (Soc’y of Corp. Compliance & Ethics
ed., 2012), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-trainingseminar/2014/org_article.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ77-3QMK] (“The ‘carrot and stick’
philosophy that undergirds the organizational guidelines rests on the realization that
corporations can, and should, be incentivized to self-police . . . .”).
53. Haugh, supra note 10, at 809; see also Bird & Park, Domains of Corporate Counsel,
supra note 14, at 212 (noting that, following the passage of the Organizational Guidelines,
“[c]ompliance was no longer an FCPA problem or an antitrust matter, but a broad issue for
organizations generally worthy of substantial attention”).
54. Lauer & Murphy, supra note 44, at 2550.
55. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021),
https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/§8B2.1 [https://perma.cc/R5A9-9VQU] [hereinafter “ORG.
GUIDELINES”] (stating that organizational compliance programs must “promote an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with
the law”) (emphasis added). This language was added in 2004 as part of a package of
amendments to the Organizational Guidelines. David Hess et al., The 2004 Amendments to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of
Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 725–26 (2006).
56. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). These
considerations apply with equal force to senior corporate executives. See Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that “corporate officers owe fiduciary duties that
are identical to those of directors”).
57. Caremark, supra note 56, at 970.
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actual risk of liability is vanishingly low,58 Caremark and its endorsement of
the Organizational Guidelines played a key role in driving compliance higher
up on directors’ list of priorities.59
That said, courts have played a relatively minor role in the growth of
compliance over the past twenty-five years, mainly due to the fact that trials
and plea deals dealing with corporate misconduct are exceedingly rare.60 In
their place, prosecutors and regulators have turned almost exclusively to
negotiated settlement agreements (i.e., deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements) to resolve alleged corporate transgressions.61 These
agreements, while often (validly) criticized,62 have the undeniable benefits
of (1) helping prosecutors and regulators address corporate crime in a costeffective and expeditious manner, and (2) allowing corporations to resolve
cases without risking an indictment that could result in disastrous collateral
consequences.63 These benefits, however, only partially explain the
exponential increase in negotiated settlements since the early 2000s.64
58. See id. at 967 (characterizing a Caremark claim as “possibly the most difficult theory
in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”); Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (affirming that Caremark claims “are among the most difficult
of corporate claims” to bring).
59. Hess, supra note 34, at 329. The fact that a handful of Caremark claims have recently
survived motions to dismiss demonstrates that it is not an entirely toothless theory and
reaffirms the importance of putting effective monitoring systems in place to minimize the risk
of corporate oversight liability. See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and
Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013 (2019) (examining these developments in detail).
60. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (discussing this trend).
61. Id. Prosecutors use non-prosecution agreements to settle cases in which no formal
charges have been filed, whereas they use deferred prosecution agreements to settle formally
filed charges. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance:
An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 18 n.90 (2014). In
both cases, judicial scrutiny is virtually nonexistent in the United States. Id.; see also infra
note 65 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates
Imposed through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 203 (2016)
(criticizing prosecutorial abuse of deferred prosecution agreements for violating rule of law
principles); David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution
Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1302
(2013) (arguing that deferred prosecution agreements “limit the punitive and deterrent value
of the government’s law enforcement efforts and extinguish the societal condemnation that
should accompany criminal prosecution”).
63. See generally Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate
Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 797 (2013) (discussing these putative benefits and arguing against the prevailing
wisdom that negotiated settlements are necessary to avoid “corporate death penalties” and
other disastrous consequences that an indictment might trigger).
64. On this marked increase in negotiated settlements, see Julie R. O’Sullivan, How
Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” Charging Policy in the Era
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Another crucial factor is the virtually unfettered discretion that
prosecutors and regulators wield when deciding whether and how to charge
corporations.65 Indeed, enforcement authorities’ eagerness to utilize this
discretion is arguably the major reason for the emergence of the present-day
compliance era.66 For one, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion has led to
substantially more corporate enforcement actions.67 For another, prosecutors
and regulators have notably used their discretion to scrutinize corporate
compliance measures, often (1) deciding whether to charge or settle with
corporations based on whether they possess an “effective” compliance
program, and (2) imposing costly compliance reforms as a condition of
settlement.68 With prosecutors preaching the “gospel” of compliance69 and
effectively doing so from “in[side] the boardroom” by imposing specific
structural and governance reforms,70 it is unsurprising that compliance has
of Deferred Prosecutions, and What that Means for the Purposes of the Federal Criminal
Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 49–50 (2014).
65. See Arlen, supra note 62, at 191–92 (noting and criticizing the “broad discretion” that
prosecutors possess in the area of corporate criminal enforcement); Rachel Brewster &
Samuel W. Buell, The Global Market for Anti-Corruption Enforcement, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 193, 207 (2017) (“No prosecutor is vested with more . . . discretion than the federal
prosecutor charged with handling corporate crime.”). As further evidence of unfettered
discretion, it is notable that two recent attempts by district court judges to exercise more
meaningful scrutiny over negotiated settlement agreements were ultimately overturned on
appeal on separation of powers grounds. See Trevor N. McFadden & Maria McMahon,
Reluctant Handmaidens: The Role of Judiciary in Corporate Settlement Agreements, GLOB.
COMPLIANCE NEWS (July 3, 2016), https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/2016/07/03/rel
uctant-handmaidens-role-judiciary-corporate-settlement-agreements-20160703/ [https://per
ma.cc/ZU7A-FHP4] (discussing the holdings in United States v. Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d 733
(D.C. Cir. 2016), and SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014)).
66. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 2086–92 (highlighting the influence of government
enforcement tactics on the rise of compliance); see also id. at 2078 (defining compliance as
“a de facto government mandate imposed upon firms by means of ex ante incentives, ex post
enforcement tactics, and formal signaling efforts”).
67. O’Sullivan, supra note 64, at 49–50.
68. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 9-28.300(A)(5) (2020) (requiring prosecutors
to consider “the adequacy and effectiveness of [a] corporation’s compliance program” when
deciding whether and how to charge corporations); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 890 (2007) (noting that non-prosecution and deferredprosecution agreements have required firms to undertake “sweeping compliance reforms”).
Arguably one of the most onerous of these prosecutor-imposed reform measures requires
corporations to hire a corporate monitor to assess their compliance programs on an ongoing
basis and provide progress reports to government enforcement agencies. On the role of
corporate monitors, see generally Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships
Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679 (2008), and Veronica Root, ModernDay Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 109 (2016).
69. Laufer, supra note 6, at 1345.
70. See generally PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO
REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011)
(collecting scholarship discussing prosecutors’ tendency to regulate corporations from within
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risen to such prominence.
II. COMPLIANCE BEST PRACTICES AND A THEORY OF CONVERGENCE
Having documented the development of compliance into a burgeoning
field, this Part turns to the underexamined topic of compliance best practices.
It observes that a deep best practices logic underpins much of compliance
policy and practice today, even though they are—perhaps ironically—better
understood as common practices. The concept of “best practices,” then,
implies some degree of convergence on compliance principles, structures,
and practices. And, importantly, not all forms of convergence are created
equal.
This Part presents a conceptual framework of compliance best practices
predicated upon three different degrees of convergence: (1) ideational; (2)
formal; and (3) functional. It further explores which of these types of
convergence best characterizes current compliance practice. Drawing upon
theoretical insights from organizational isomorphism, the discussion
illuminates a host of dynamics that, in tandem, tend to promote a formal
convergence on particular compliance structures. Problematically, this
copycat-oriented adoption of so-called “best practices” will likely not
advance, and may well impede, the implementation of well-established,
“best of the best” practices in compliance theory and practice—the
promotion of ethical behavior within firms and the customization of
compliance structures to ensure that they mesh with prevailing
organizational cultures.
A. The Rhetoric and Concept of “Best Practices”
It is fair to say that “corporate compliance” has become a popular
buzzword of the day.71 Amid all this rhetoric, though, is a related buzzword
that is just as readily invoked yet nowhere near as closely examined—best
practices. At first blush, this might seem surprising. After all, one does not
have to survey the compliance landscape for long before one is inundated
with a plethora of lists, guides, and manuals purporting to provide

by imposing specific compliance reforms).
71. See Simon Stapleton, Why Compliance is the Business Buzzword to Watch,
SIMONSTAPLETON.COM (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.simonstapleton.com/wordpress/2018/
11/07/why-compliance-is-the-business-buzzword-to-watch/ [https://perma.cc/PR2A-ZK89]
(describing compliance as the “business buzzword of the moment”); cf. Pub. Citizen v. United
States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 196, 215 n.24 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting
“the importance . . . companies place on their compliance programs . . . and the general
importance all companies place on best practices in corporate governance and structure”).
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compliance “best practices.”72 This vast array of sources can be
overwhelming, frequently advertising some “magic” number of best
practices for firms to implement—anywhere from three73 to five74 to seven75
to ten76 to fourteen77 to as many as 300,000.78
For all their popularity in the public lexicon, however, best practices
have not yet been systematically examined within the growing body of legal
scholarship on corporate compliance.79 This is a glaring oversight given that
so much of compliance policy and practice is driven by an apparent
fascination with supposed “best practices.”80 Unpacking this phenomenon,
therefore, would contribute to scholarly efforts seeking to identify common

72. A Google search for “compliance best practices” returned over 83,400 hits. See also
supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (surveying sources of best practices); MIKE
KOEHLER, STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING RISK UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
AND RELATED LAWS 281 (2018) (acknowledging that lists of compliance best practices can be
“overwhelming”).
73. Paul Norris, 3 Best Practices for Customizing Your Compliance Program, TRIPWIRE
(May 2, 2021), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/regulatory-compliance/best-practi
ces-for-customizing-your-compliance-program/ [https://perma.cc/PS98-WHVR].
74. 5 Compliance Best Practices, DISTRIBION (Apr. 13, 2011), https://distribion.com/5compliance-best-practices/ [https://perma.cc/3GGA-85P4].
75. Caryl Anne Crowne, Corporate Compliance Best Practices 2019, THE COMPLIANCE
& ETHICS BLOG (Mar. 27, 2019), https://complianceandethics.org/corporate-compliance-bestpractices-2019/ [https://perma.cc/EBA4-WP6M].
76. Regulatory Compliance Best Practices, POWERDMS (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.p
owerdms.com/policy-learning-center/regulatory-compliance-best-practices [https://perma.cc
/RJJ6-YF89].
77. Apryl Motley, Compliance Best Practices, INDEP. BANKER, Oct. 2011, at 39.
78. See MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN, BUILDING A WORLD-CLASS COMPLIANCE PROGRAM:
BEST PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS app. C (2008) (describing a resource that
purports to provide over 300,000 compliance best practices).
79. Although terse criticisms of compliance best practices are not uncommon. See, e.g.,
Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1065 (2008) (criticizing
compliance best practices for promoting a “herd mentality”); Todd Haugh, Harmonizing
Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance through the Paradigm of Behavioral Ethics
Risk, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 873, 879 (2019) (“The idea is to avoid the trap of blindly following
current “best practices,” which are often misguided, and instead target the true precursors to
corporate wrongdoing . . . .”); Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L.
887, 913 (2007) (noting the diffusion of corporate governance “best practices” and
questioning their efficacy).
80. See supra notes 72–78 (illustrating this widespread fascination); Baer, supra note 13,
at 968 (noting that various prosecutorial guidelines, which have great weight in the corporate
compliance domain, seek to memorialize corporate compliance “best practices”). Regarding
the frequent obsession with (some might even say fetishization of) best practices, see Peter
Boxall, The Future of Employment Relations from the Perspective of Human Resource
Management, 56 J. INDUS. RELS. 578, 581 (2014) (referring to this tendency as “bestpracticism”), and Anand Sanwal, The Myth of Best Practices, J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN., July–
Aug. 2008, at 51, 51 (same).
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threads that unite corporate compliance as a distinct, cohesive discipline.81
It would also go some way toward addressing concerns that corporate
compliance remains a “seriously undertheorized” subject.82
As a threshold matter, it is important to first define the oft-unexamined
concept of best practices and sketch its core features. Generally speaking,
scholarly works that focus specifically on best practices, whether in the
corporate context or otherwise, are rare.83 Among legal scholars, David
Zaring has written the most comprehensive account, persuasively arguing
that best practices are really not “best” at all: “[A]lthough best practices seem
imbued with a sense of technocratic possibility . . . it need not necessarily be
a particularly thoughtful concept. Indeed, the widespread adoption of best
practices may tell us very little about the ‘bestness’ of the practice. Best
practices work through copying.”84 Many courts have seemingly recognized
these limitations, holding on numerous occasions that failing to act in
accordance with purported corporate “best practices” does not give rise to an
actionable legal claim.85
81. Cf. Root, supra note 31, at 244 (arguing that her proposed “compliance process”
framework contributes to an understanding of compliance as a discrete field of study in its
own right).
82. Griffith, supra note 3, at 2133. For some recent attempts to shore up these theoretical
deficiencies, see ANNA DONOVAN, RECONCEPTUALIZING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE:
RESPONSIBILITY, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 13–18 (2021) (examining the problem of “creative
compliance” and advocating for a reconceptualization of compliance that stresses adherence
to the spirit (not just the letter) of the law); David Orozco, A Systems Theory of Compliance
Law, 22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 244 (2020) (proposing a systems theory of compliance); Root, supra
note 31 (proposing a processual framework of compliance).
83. For some notable exceptions, see Steven Bernstein & Hamish van der Ven, Best
Practices in Global Governance, 43 REV. INT’L STUD. 534 (2017) (analyzing best practices
as a mode of global governance); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Rachel Kahn Best & Lauren B.
Edelman, When ‘Best Practices’ Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial
Inference in Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Cases, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 843
(2015) (critiquing the judicial deference given to compliance best practices in the area of
employment discrimination law); David Nelken, Whose Best Practices? The Significance of
Context in and for Transnational Criminal Justice Indicators, 46 J.L. & SOC’Y S31 (2019)
(analyzing best practices in transnational criminal justice); Ira P. Robbins, “Best Practices”:
What’s the Point?, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 321 (2009) (engaging in a definitional debate on “best
practices” in the context of legal education); Zaring, supra note 17 (examining the use of best
practices in administrative law).
84. Zaring, supra note 17, at 325–26. Professor Zaring treats best practices as a specific
mode of regulation, one that regulators employ to encourage greater experimentation and
input from regulated entities. See id. at 297 (“[B]est practices are a method of regulation that
works through horizontal modeling rather than hierarchical direction.”).
85. See, e.g., Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty., 409 F. Supp. 3d 19, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(distinguishing best practices from enforceable legal mandates); Lamb v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 3d 904, 913 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (“[N]or does industry best
practice amount to legal requirements.”); Wilkin v. Narachi, No. 12412-VCMR, 2018 WL
1100372, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2018) (noting a “difference between a best practice and a
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Fundamentally, then, best practices present an irony—far from actually
being “best” in any definitive or verifiable sense, they are essentially a
euphemism for common practices.86 Indeed, according to two prominent
political scientists, “[B]est practices largely represent a consensus on . . .
existing practices, not on the types of practices that should or could be in
place.”87 This “consensus” on common practices, furthermore, need not exist
in any meaningful sense; all that is required for best practices to garner
legitimacy, on their account, is the mere “appearance of consensus.”88 In
other words, “best practices” are those that are commonly used and seem to
be generally accepted by others as the way things ought to be done. This
lack of sophistication should give pause to those who trumpet the promise of
compliance best practices in panacea-like terms.89
Having said that, the paradoxical nature of “best practices as common
practices” does not necessarily mean that best practices are worthless or
hopelessly problematic. Adopting similar or common practices may, at
times, be desirable.90 To understand how and when this might (and might
not) be the case, one must first appreciate that similarity or commonality is
often a matter of degree. That is, there can be varying conceptions of “best
practices,” each predicated upon a different degree of convergence on
common practice—some firms may adopt best practices by essentially
copying generally accepted compliance structures, whereas others may adopt
best practices in a manner that permits greater structural variance and
legal obligation”); see also Salim v. Mobile Telesystems PJSC, 2021 WL 796088, at *11–12
(E.D.N.Y Mar. 1, 2021) (surveying case law on corporate puffery and finding that a
corporation’s general statements about complying with “global best practices” fit within that
doctrine and did not give rise to legal liability). But see In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative
Litig., 900 F. Supp. 2d 467, 490 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding that a corporate board did not “insulate
itself from reporting on quality control issues” due to evidence that it had created a welltailored compliance committee consistent with “best practice”). Notably, at least one court
has strongly encouraged firms to adopt best practices. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“This Court strongly encourages directors and
officers to employ best practices . . . .”).
86. Zaring, supra note 17, at 325–26; see also id. at 300 (“The paradigm is to keep up
with the Joneses, instead of doing the Joneses one better.”).
87. Bernstein & van der Ven, supra note 83, at 538 (emphasis in original).
88. Id.
89. For two excellent critiques of best practices in the field of corporate governance more
generally, see Jennifer Johnson, What’s Good for the Goose? A Critical Essay on “Best
Practices” for Private Firms, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 251 (2007), and David F. Larcker & Brian
Tayan, Loosey-Goosey Governance (Stan. Closer Look Series CGRP79, 2019),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-79-looseygoosey-governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WR9-K9UZ]. See also Lightfoot v. District of
Columbia, 339 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 n.1 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[T]he term ‘best practices’ often tends
to be murky and ambiguous.”), rev’d on other grounds, 448 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
90. See Zaring, supra note 17, at 300 (“[S]ameness—even sameness with suboptimal
standards—has its own attractions.”).
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context-specific tailoring.91 The next section will develop these ideas by
drawing upon insights from the comparative corporate governance literature
on convergence.
B. Three Levels of Convergence
The adoption of similar governance practices has long interested
corporate governance scholars. Typically, they have pursued this interest
under the banner of convergence, examining the extent to which corporate
governance systems have converged on common ideological orientations or
governance structures.92 Importantly, convergence can take different forms,
and these different manifestations can affect the extent to which a given
convergence on “best practices” is (or is not) desirable.
This section proposes a conceptual framework of compliance best
practices. This framework outlines three different degrees of convergence
along a rough spectrum: (1) ideational; (2) formal; and (3) functional. The
first type is my own term, while the second and third types are adapted from
Ronald Gilson’s work on comparative corporate governance.93 First,
ideational convergence pertains to a high-level consensus on general
principles, ideals, and aspirations. There has clearly been a great deal of
ideational convergence in the compliance field in recent decades, with highlevel consensus on the importance of compliance within corporate law and
91. Cf. generally WADE JACOBY, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
NATO: ORDERING FROM THE MENU IN CENTRAL EUROPE (2004) (demonstrating that other
modes of emulation exist besides rote mimicry).
92. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate
Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 213 (1999) (arguing that global convergence on a “new, hybrid
governance system comprised of the best practices drawn from different systems” is both
unlikely and undesirable); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (arguing famously that “[d]espite very real
differences in . . . corporate systems, the deeper tendency is toward convergence” on a model
of corporate governance predicated upon shareholder primacy); Dionysia Katelouzou & Peer
Zumbansen, The New Geographies of Corporate Governance, 42 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 51, 109–
11 (2020) (collecting sources and discussing differing scholarly opinions on the “convergence
thesis” in comparative corporate governance); Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The
Corporate Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2563, 2566 (2021) (criticizing
corporate law’s “shareholderist orientation” in part for engendering a problematic
“convergence on one-size-fits-all governance ‘best practices’”); Roberta Romano, A
Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021,
2025 (1993) (criticizing efforts to promote a global convergence in corporate governance by
encouraging the mimicry of formal organizational structures). See generally CONVERGENCE
AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004)
(compiling scholarship on the concept of convergence in comparative corporate governance).
93. Gilson, supra note 19; see also Coffee, Jr., supra note 19, at 649 n.27 (discussing
Gilson’s theory of convergence).
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governance, the need to tailor compliance programs to corporations’
particular cultural dynamics, and the value of integrating ethical
considerations into the compliance function.94 Second, formal convergence
entails the copying of formal governance structures found in other
corporations.95 As the next section will show, the corporate enforcement
landscape is replete with pressures pushing corporations toward a formalistic
convergence on compliance structures and processes.96 Third, functional
convergence involves “the use of strikingly different institutional forms to
accomplish a common objective.”97 For example, corporate governance
systems that are widely divergent in a formal sense (i.e., they rely on
different policies or structural mechanisms) may nonetheless be similarly
effective at disciplining poorly performing senior managers; such systems
would therefore be functionally convergent.98
Figure 1 illustrates the general relationship between these different
degrees of convergence. The two extremes are ideational convergence and
formal convergence—the former involves virtually no structural
implementation and exists only on the level of shared ideas and aspirations,
whereas the latter entails substantial structural mimicry of particular
organizational processes and structures. In-between lies functional
convergence, which involves a convergence on substantive outcomes that
are more specific than ideational convergence entails along with a greater
divergence of structure than formal convergence permits. Admittedly, the
precise boundaries between these different degrees of convergence are hard
to delineate,99 but this difficulty should not render the distinctions
unilluminating. By conceptualizing these three types of convergence as
degrees on a spectrum, one can reasonably navigate these difficulties by
examining the extent to which a given practice seems to lean more or less
toward one kind of convergence or another.

94. See supra Part I (illustrating convergence in these areas).
95. See Gilson, supra note 19, at 333 (characterizing this type of convergence as
involving the adoption of similar “institutional forms”); cf. Iain MacNeil, Adaptation and
Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies, 21 J. CORP.
L. STUD. 289, 295 (2002) (“Formal convergence involves change in the legal
infrastructure. . . .”).
96. See infra Part II.C.2. 2.
Isomorphic Pressures and Compliance Responses
(examining some of these pressures).
97. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic
Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169, 174 (2004).
98. Gilson, supra note 19, at 337.
99. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 19, at 682 n.148 (discussing the difficulty of teasing apart
formal and functional convergence in practice).
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FIGURE 1: COMPLIANCE CONVERGENCE SPECTRUM

Ideational
Convergence

Functional
Convergence

Formal
Convergence

C. Conceptualizing Convergence in Compliance Today
This section will apply the convergence spectrum to corporate
compliance to assess what kind of convergence on “best practices” seems to
be occurring. To guide this inquiry, the discussion will draw upon
organizational isomorphism, a theory that explains the various forces
encouraging organizations to adopt similar forms and structures. By
examining the nature of the pressures driving convergence in corporate
compliance, one can assess whether the type of convergence that is occurring
is more ideational, functional, or formal in orientation. As will be shown, all
signs point toward a fairly formalistic level of convergence on common
compliance best practices.
1.

Theoretical Foundations: Organizational Isomorphism

Before turning to an examination of convergence in the compliance
field, it is worth briefly introducing organizational isomorphism, the
theoretical lens that will guide this analysis. Isomorphism is a popularly used
framework in the fields of management and organizational sociology,100 and
among legal scholars it tends to be employed by adherents to the Law and
Society tradition.101 As such, it stresses the central influences of social norms
100. See generally Eva Boxenbaum & Stefan Jonsson, Isomorphism, Diffusion and
Decoupling: Concept Evolution and Theoretical Challenges, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 79, 79–104 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2d ed.
2017) (providing an overview of isomorphism from the perspective of management and
organizational studies).
101. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421 (2016)
(examining patent law through the lens of isomorphism); Simin Gao, Legal Pluralism and
Isomorphism in Global Financial Regulation: The Case of OTC Derivative Counterparty Risk
Regulation in China, 51 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 145 (2019) (employing isomorphism in
the context of derivatives market regulation); James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism:
The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE
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(which establish a “logic of appropriateness”) and the need to be perceived
as socially legitimate on organizational behavior.102
In basic terms, isomorphism means “being of identical or similar form
or shape or structure.”103 Thus, the object of the theory is to explain what
pressures lead organizations to become increasingly similar over time. Three
different types of pressures are articulated: (1) coercive; (2) mimetic; and (3)
normative.104 Coercive pressures generally stem from laws and their
enforcement.105 Mimetic pressures stem from environmental uncertainty and
lead risk-averse organizations to imitate the practices of their peers in
response.106 Finally, normative pressures stem from professional values held
by organizational members who belong to epistemic communities outside
their organizations.107 Over time, their identification with these communities
leads them to endorse particular policies within their organizations that, over
time, leads different organizations to become increasingly similar.108 The
next section will use these three different isomorphic pressures in turn to
frame its examination of convergence in the corporate compliance domain.

L. REV. 31 (2014) (using isomorphism to examine convergence in the development of U.S.
state constitutions); Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996) (book
review) (discussing applications of isomorphism to the organizational construction of legal
compliance).
102. See Martin Lodge & Kai Wegrich, Control Over Government: Institutional
Isomorphism and Governance Dynamics in German Public Administration, 33 POL’Y STUD.
J. 213, 215 (2005) (“The notion of ‘institutional isomorphism’ stresses the importance of
legitimacy and the logic of appropriateness for processes of homogenization.”). The seminal
works here are Paul DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147
(1983), and John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977). See also Kishanthi Parella,
Compliance as an Exchange of Legitimacy for Influence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LEGAL PLURALISM 769, 774 (Paul Schiff Berman ed., 2020) (discussing how organizations
confronting uncertainty tend to copy each other “to appear more legitimate because of
pressure from other organizations or societal expectations”).
103. Kristi D. Caravella, Mimetic, Coercive, and Normative Influences in
Institutionalization of Organizational Practices: The Case of Distance Learning in Higher
Education 2 (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida Atlantic University)
(ProQuest).
104. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 102, at 150–54 (describing these isomorphic
pressures in detail).
105. Id. at 150–51.
106. Id. at 151–52.
107. Id. at 152–53.
108. See id. at 152 (“[W]hile various kinds of professionals within an organization may
differ from one another, they exhibit much similarity to their professional counterparts in
other organizations.”).
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Isomorphic Pressures and Compliance Responses
(a) Coercive Isomorphism and Compliance

Coercive isomorphism involves laws and enforcement practices that
lead organizations to converge on similar organizational structures. Two
different sources of coercive isomorphism are apparent in the context of
corporate compliance: (1) the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and (2)
the terms of negotiated settlement agreements. First, the Organizational
Guidelines explicitly state that “[a]n organization’s failure to incorporate and
follow applicable industry practice” will count against it in an assessment of
the adequacy of its compliance program.109 They also state that organizations
may improve their chances of meeting the requirements of the guidelines by
“modeling [their] compliance and ethics program[s] on existing, wellregarded compliance and ethics programs and best practices of other similar
organizations.”110 These statements, backed by the coercive nature of legal
authority, ensure that corporations face substantial pressure to copy standard
practices, procedures, and compliance structures commonly used by other
corporations.
A second source of coercive isomorphic pressure stems from the
language of negotiated settlement agreements. There are a couple of ways
in which this pressure tends to manifest. First, many deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements explicitly state that the corporations
agreeing to them must abide by “evolving international and industry
standards.”111 Second, these agreements frequently specify particular
compliance reforms (e.g., the appointment of a Chief Compliance Officer
and the separation of that officer from the corporation’s legal department112),
leading corporations to treat them as quasi-precedential113 or as a kind of
“‘common law’ of . . . compliance best practices[.]”114 Thus, both the
109. ORG. GUIDELINES, supra note 55, § 8B2.1. cmt. n.2(A)–(B).
110. Id. cmt. n.2(C)(iii)(IV).
111. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 33, United States v. Alstom Grid, Inc.,
No. 3:14-cr-00247-JBA (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2014) (containing this language).
112. DeStefano, supra note 25, at 104; see also Cunningham, supra note 61, at 35–39
(criticizing the use of deferred prosecution agreements for promoting the implementation of
“off-the-rack governance” mechanisms). Such requirements frequently “elevate form over
function.” DeStefano, supra note 25, at 84; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003)
(arguing that internal compliance structures may often function as mere window-dressing).
113. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 2090 (noting that negotiated settlement agreements
“have a precedential impact on similarly situated firms”).
114. Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in
Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 723 (2009).
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language of these agreements and their quasi-precedential status in corporate
enforcement provide significant pressure on corporations to mimic other
corporations’ formal compliance structures.
(b) Mimetic Isomorphism and Compliance
Mimetic isomorphism stems from uncertainty, something that is quite
plentiful in the field of corporate compliance. Indeed, three different types
of uncertainty might be identified: (1) inherent uncertainty; (2) enforcement
uncertainty; and (3) empirical uncertainty. First, white-collar criminal law
and other areas of law that are particularly applicable to corporate
compliance are notoriously and inherently replete with ambiguities.115
Second, enforcement authorities (largely due to discretionary guidelines and
a lack of judicial oversight) often do not craft negotiated settlement
agreements in a clear or consistent fashion, resulting in the imposition of
unpredictable penalties and compliance reform mandates.116 As a result,
even though corporations treat the requirements articulated in negotiated
settlement agreements as quasi-precedential, implementing measures that
are mentioned in prior agreements is far from a guarantee that the corporation
will make it through a future enforcement action unscathed. Third, although
compliance programs have been in vogue for more than three decades, there
remains an astonishing lack of empirical evidence as to which compliance
measures actually work.117
Faced with these multiple sources of
considerable uncertainty, it should come as no surprise that corporations
often respond by mimicking popular compliance structures.118 Such mimicry
may not be particularly effective, but it seems better than doing nothing, and

115. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. 225,
226–27 (2018) (collecting authorities criticizing the manifold ambiguities presented by whitecollar criminal statutes).
116. See Arlen, supra note 62, at 191–92 (criticizing inconsistent corporate enforcement
practices); see also GARRETT, supra note 60, at 277 (arguing that “[t]elling a company to just
adopt ‘best practices’ does not give real guidance”).
117. See Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2020) (“[I]t is a pervasive problem that we lack metrics to evaluate
whether compliance programs . . . actually reduce underlying violations.”); William S.
Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal Law, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
71, 80 n.28 (2017) (“It is remarkable and yet true that systematic reviews of corporate crime
deterrence research reveal no systematic evidence of effectiveness.”).
118. See Baer, supra note 13, at 999 n.299 (“Firms take safety in practices that are widely
heralded and used, regardless of their effectiveness.”); Stucke, supra note 16, at 822 (“Given
the paucity of data of effective compliance programs, firms opt for the second best and find
safety in numbers.”); see also Margaret Forster et al., Commonality in Codes of Ethics, 90 J.
BUS. ETHICS 129, 139 (2009) (finding substantial mimicry among the ethics codes of firms on
the S&P 500).
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corporate actors can take some comfort in knowing (1) that they are
following what appear to be generally accepted “best practices” and (2) that
they may receive credit from prosecutors in future enforcement actions for
adopting them.
(c) Normative Isomorphism and Compliance
Normative isomorphism involves the adoption of similar organizational
structures on the basis of extra-organizational professional values to which
certain organizational actors subscribe. Here, the relevant actors are
compliance professionals, both those working within corporate compliance
departments and those serving as external consultants to corporations. A
major part of compliance’s ascendancy in recent years has been the growing
popularity of compliance-specific conferences and professional societies.119
These developments have contributed significantly to the establishment of
compliance as a distinct professional identity, one that transcends
organizational boundaries and unites compliance professionals worldwide.120
In furtherance of this identity, the work of these conferences and professional
associations “promote[s] standard compliance practices” and provides
opportunities for compliance professionals to get together and share “best
practices.”121 These professionals can then draw upon what they have
learned in these settings and apply them to their own specific corporate work
environments, making adjustments as necessary.
It is clear that normative isomorphic pressures stemming from
compliance officers’ professional identity and associations are encouraging
a convergence in compliance practice. However, the precise nature of this
convergence—absent further empirical inquiry—is not entirely clear. On the
one hand, the fact that compliance officers and consultants are acquiring
knowledge about common practices and standard procedures is suggestive
of a formal convergence. On the other hand, the importance of ethical
considerations and tailoring compliance programs to meet corporations’
specific cultural realities are well-established principles of compliance, and
they are surely emphasized in compliance officers’ professional networks,
societies, and gatherings. This would suggest that normative isomorphism
may be a force for functional convergence, one that results in corporations
using different means to converge on common desirable outcomes such as
the promotion of ethical organizational cultures. Even if this is the case,
though, coercive (legal) and mimetic (uncertainty) pressures undoubtedly
generate a strong pull toward “copycat” convergence, one that may
119. Fanto, supra note 25, at 211.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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realistically hinder the capacity of compliance officers to do anything other
than mimic other corporations’ formal compliance structures despite their
best intentions.122 After all, from the standpoint of government enforcement
authorities, “the best practice is to comply with the law”123—meaning that
risk-averse compliance officers will face substantial pressure to adopt the
formal structures and processes deemed necessary to appease prosecutors
and regulators, however ineffectual or counterproductive they might be.124
3.

Silver Bullets, Bandwagons, and Formal Convergence

While further empirical research is needed, the preceding conceptual
discussion indicates that the isomorphic pressures brought to bear on
corporations have, by and large, tended to promote a fairly formalistic
convergence on common compliance “best practices.” That is, much of
compliance policy and practice tends toward a copycat-type convergence on
formal compliance policies and structures. The implications of this tendency
are twofold, both of which are problematic from the standpoint of those
looking to develop more effective ethics and compliance programs.
First, it encourages a “silver bullet mindset,” meaning that it leads
compliance officers and other organizational actors to focus on identifying
the “right” institutional structure or mix of structures that will satisfy
government regulators.125 This focus, however, is misguided. No “right”
mix of formal structures likely exists and, even if it did, such an emphasis
loses sight of the central role that ethical and cultural considerations should
play in the operation of a viable compliance program.126 Second, this
122. Cf. id. at 237 (characterizing corporate compliance in the United States, for all its
emphasis on ethics and culture, as fundamentally—and perhaps unavoidably—“law centric”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at
Compliance Week’s 2018 Annual Conference for Compliance and Risk Professionals (May
21, 2018) (emphasis added).
124. See Haugh, supra note 37, at 1215–17 (describing how Intel adopted an “active
approach” to compliance that “mimicked the actions of aggressive regulators[,]” which
ultimately did more to exacerbate organizational misconduct); see also Krawiec, supra note
112, at 536 (“[C]ourts and regulatory bodies frequently measure compliance with the law
against the industry standard . . . .”); Krieger et al., supra note 83, at 851 (highlighting the
legal “[d]eference [afforded] to formalized business practices”).
125. MICHAEL JOHNSTON & SCOTT A. FRITZEN, THE CONUNDRUM OF CORRUPTION 67
(2021) was the source of inspiration for this “silver bullet” metaphor.
126. See Stucke, supra note 16, at 822 (“[W]idespread plagiarism of ethics codes raises
significant concerns about the firms’ commitment to an ethical culture.”); Cheryl L. Wade,
Corporate Compliance that Advances Racial Diversity and Justice and Why Business
Deregulation Does Not Matter, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 611, 625 (2018) (“[B]est practices cannot
change corporate cultures and climates.”); see also Coglianese & Nash, supra note 2626, at
584 (cautioning against “expecting too much from the mere formalization of a compliance
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formalistic convergence on best practices promotes a “bandwagon effect”
that encourages firms to engage in the rote mimicry of others’ compliance
structures simply because these structures seem to be commonly accepted.127
As with the silver bullet mindset, this bandwagon effect is unlikely to
promote an effective approach to compliance. On the contrary, it risks
undermining the core tenets of ethics and cultural tailoring that are supposed
to lie at the core of highly functioning compliance programs, promoting a
one-size-fits-all mindset in their stead.128
III. AN ILLUSTRATION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. The Case of Transnational Anti-Bribery Compliance
To further illustrate the nature of the formal convergence that has
gripped compliance in recent years, this section will focus on a particular
area of corporate compliance—transnational anti-bribery compliance. It will
briefly show how an initial ideational convergence on the importance of
combating and mitigating the risk of transnational corruption has
increasingly developed into a more formalistic convergence on particular
anti-bribery instruments. It will then provide a couple of suggestions as to
how anti-bribery compliance might move toward a more desirable functional
convergence.
Anti-bribery compliance emerged as an important global phenomenon
at the turn of the century.129 While the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA)—widely regarded as one of the most influential transnational antibribery laws in the world—was passed in 1977, it took many years for
enforcement to grow and for other countries to pass similar laws
criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.130 However, beginning in the
early 2000s, anti-bribery enforcement grew considerably and, with it,
widespread consensus on the importance of anti-bribery compliance.131 This
‘system’”).
127. See Baer, supra note 79, at 1065 (describing this “herd mentality”).
128. See Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129, 146
(2018) (“While it is oft-repeated that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ compliance program, the
reality is that most programs look very much alike . . . .”).
129. See JOHNSTON & FRITZEN, supra note 125, at 3 (“Over the past 30 years,
corruption . . . has vaulted from obscurity to a place near the top of the international policy
agenda.”).
130. See Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic
Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 1611, 1645–46 (2017) (discussing the paucity of transnational anticorruption enforcement during the latter part of the twentieth century).
131. The reasons for this escalation in enforcement are too many to list here, but principal
reasons include the passage of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which led to the
widespread criminalization of transnational bribery among its member states, and the rise of
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ideational convergence, however, has increasingly morphed into a more
formalistic one. One major reason for this development is the global
diffusion of corporate negotiated settlement agreements, which are used
more frequently in the anti-bribery space than in any other area of
compliance.132 In recent decades, some foreign governments have
effectively mimicked U.S. policy by implementing similar systems of
corporate liability and negotiated settlement to address transnational
bribery.133 Such mimicry has given rise to an increasingly international
convergence in anti-bribery compliance, one that arguably tracks the
formalistic approach to compliance that characterizes the American system.
Indeed, by their very nature, negotiated settlement agreements stress the
implementation of formal compliance structures and tend to encourage the
mimicry of other corporations’ compliance systems.134 The widespread
diffusion of such agreements, therefore, would tend to promote more of a
formal convergence in corporate anti-bribery policy.135
There are at least a couple of ways in which firms and regulators might
move toward a more desirable functional convergence. First, regulators
could work to customize their approaches to negotiated settlements136 and do
negotiated settlement agreements in the United States, which gave prosecutors the tools to
bring anti-bribery enforcement actions at comparatively low costs and with much greater
frequency. See generally Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84 (2014) (discussing the OECD
Convention); GARRETT, supra note 60 (discussing the rise of corporate negotiated settlement
agreements).
132. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1797
(2011); Koehler Reforms Challenge FCPA Inc., CORP. CRIME REP. (July 29, 2014, 5:37 PM),
https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/koehler-reform-proposal-challenges-fcp
a-inc/ [https://perma.cc/S5QM-2P8U].
133. On this trend, see generally Radha Ivory & Tina Søreide, The International
Endorsement of Corporate Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases, 69 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q.
945 (2020). See also Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations
and the Global Expansion of Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 705
(2020) (describing other countries’ emulation of the U.S. model of corporate criminal
enforcement).
134. Griffith, supra note 3, at 2090; see also Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Enforcement and Related Developments, 89 MISS. L.J. 227, 296 (2020) (arguing that, in
the FCPA context, “the SEC often advances enforcement theories, with the perfect benefit of
hindsight, that seem to equate failure to act consistent with ‘best practices’ (as fuzzy and
undefined as that term is) with legal violations”).
135. See generally Simon St-Georges & Denis Saint-Martin, The Global Diffusion of
DPAs: The Not So Functional Remaking of the Rules Against Business Corruption, in THE
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW 469, 485–88 (Régis Bismuth et al. eds.,
2021) (examining the global diffusion of negotiated settlements through the lens of
isomorphism and arguing that more research is needed to better establish the extent to which
mimicry has driven their proliferation).
136. Such efforts appear to be underway, with different jurisdictions developing systems
of negotiated settlement that aim to address perceived weaknesses in the American system.
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so in ways that take seriously the importance of tailoring anti-bribery
compliance measures to organization-specific cultural dynamics, operational
realities, and ethical aspirations. Second, firms might look to draw upon
private anti-bribery compliance standards, data analytics tools, or
governance indicators, which have risen in prominence in recent years and
are designed to provide room for context-specific tailoring and empirical
assessment.137 Although such mechanisms have their flaws,138 they do
provide opportunities for corporations and government regulators to take
customization and the measurement of compliance more seriously.139 While
these are preliminary suggestions, they would go at least some way toward
addressing the formalistic type of convergence that has emerged within the
global anti-corruption regime.
B. Toward a “Best Practices” Research Agenda
This Comment takes the necessary first step of placing the study of
corporate compliance best practices on the scholarly agenda. Looking ahead,
legal scholars might look to advance this agenda in the following ways.
First, scholars should strive to conduct more sophisticated empirical research
to identify compliance practices that are, in a meaningful sense, “best” or
most effective in specific policy areas (e.g., antitrust or anti-money
laundering) and in light of particular contextual considerations.140 Second,
scholars should pay greater attention to the interplay between different
developers or sources of best practices, with a particular eye toward
identifying ways to increase fruitful exchanges of information between
See, e.g., COLIN KING & NICHOLAS LORD, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE AND CORPORATE CRIME 67–
82 (2018) (discussing deferred prosecution agreements in the U.K. and how legislators have
strived to make modifications that differentiate them from the U.S. system of negotiated
settlement, most notably the introduction of more meaningful judicial oversight).
137. See sources supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting the emergence of new
international compliance standards); Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle
Merry, Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 71, 71–72
(2012) (discussing the rise of governance indicators); Haugh, supra note 10, at 816–18
(discussing the heightened use of data analytics in corporate compliance).
138. See, e.g., Heaston, supra note 12 (examining the pitfalls associated with an emerging
international compliance standard-setting scheme).
139. See Laufer, supra note 117, at 93 (arguing that “a gestalt of models, measures,
metrics, data, analytics, standards, committed compliance professionals, relevant compliance
scholarship, and vast firm resources dedicated to promoting compliance” represents “an
opportunistic convergence of formal and informal social controls” that may result in a more
evidence-based approach to corporate compliance).
140. Calls for such research have been particularly forceful in recent years. See, e.g.,
Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 117; Eugene Soltes, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Corporate
Compliance Programs: Establishing a Model for Prosecutors, Courts, and Firms, 14 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 965 (2018).

780

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

governmental and non-governmental actors so that all relevant parties can
achieve a better understanding of specific best practices.141 Third, scholars
should further explore the notion of “best practices as common practices” by
(1) expanding on the convergence spectrum proposed in this Comment and
(2) applying other theoretical frameworks to the corporate compliance
domain to identify additional types of convergence on common “best
practices” that might be conceptually insightful or practically useful.142
CONCLUSION
The point of this Comment has not been to besmirch compliance best
practices. Dismissing them out of hand would be imprudent, particularly
when one appreciates that different degrees of convergence on best practices
can exist. Rather, the point has been to call attention to the underexamined
concept of compliance best practices and the problems they can pose when
corporations adopt them in a formalistic, “copycat” fashion. Best practices,
particularly to the extent that they are subjected to more robust empirical
validation in the future, may indeed be helpful in some circumstances.
However, they may also crowd out the ethical considerations and culturalspecific tailoring that compliance programs need in order to flourish.
Corporate actors, enforcement authorities, compliance professionals, and
legal scholars must become more cognizant of these pitfalls going forward.
To do so, they will need to dispense with thoughtless invocations of “best
practices” and, perhaps for the first time, ask themselves what they mean by
the phrase and what (if anything) makes them “best.”

141. See, e.g., Veronica Root Martinez, The Government’s Prioritization of Information
Over Sanction: Implications for Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 109 (2020)
(arguing that “[t]he government could harness the information it is receiving to create and
publish best practices for achieving effective compliance within firms”).
142. For some potential theoretical frameworks and concepts, see JOHN L. CAMPBELL,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 65, 71 (2004) (using the concepts of “bricolage”
and “translation” to depict variations in convergence); JACOBY, supra note 91, at 5–12
(outlining four different modes of policy emulation: copies, templates, thresholds, and
patches); William Twining, Legal Pluralism 101, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT
112, 119, 125 (Brian Z. Tamanaha et al. eds., 2012) (discussing various theoretical concepts
relevant to research on convergence, such as policy diffusion, legal transplantation,
harmonization, imitation, adaptation, and partial integration).

